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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether appellant's failure to transmit the record of 
the lower court proceeding and to make appropriate 
references to pages in the record necessitates the 
presumption that the trial court ruled correctly. 
Whether under the wrongful death statute. Section 
78-11-7, U.C.A. (1953) and the comparative negligence 
statute. Section 78-27-37, U.C.A. (1973), (repealed 
1976), the trial court properly instructed the jury 
that the negligence of appellant's decedent should be 
compared to that of the respondents for the purpose of 
determining liability and damages. 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to repudiate the stipulation knowingly signed 
by plaintiffs then authorized legal counsel. 
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that only 
lawful heirs may sue for damages under the wrongful 
death statute. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
I. Section 78-11-7, U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
"Death of adult - When heir and representatives may 
sue. Except as provided in chapter 1, of Title 35f 
when the death of a person not a minor is caused by 
the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or 
his personal representatives for the benefit of his 
heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the 
person causing the death, or, if such person is 
employed by another person who is responsible for his 
conduct, then also against such other person. If such 
adult person has a guardian at the time of his death, 
only one action can be maintained for the injury to or 
death of such person, and such action may be brought 
by either the personal representatives of such adult 
deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by 
such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as provided 
in the next preceding section [78-11-6]. In every 
action under this and the next preceding section 
[78-11-6] such damages may be given as under all the 
circumstances of the case may be just." 
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II. Former Section 78-27-37, U.C.A. (1973, repealed 1986), 
provides: 
Comparative negligence - Diminishment of Damages 
"Contributory Negligence" Includes "Assumption of the 
Risk." 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or his legal representative to 
recover damages for negligence or gross negligence 
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, 
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence 
or gross negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. As used in 
this Act, "contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On October 31, 1986, Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
Third District Court Judge, stated for the record his rulings, 
and the bases for his rulings, on two issues which are now 
before this Court: (1) whether the brothers and sisters of the 
deceased may sue for damages and testify concerning their 
losses arising out of the death of their brother; and (2) the 
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validity of a pre-trial stipulation entered into between 
respective counsel. A third issue which is before this Court, 
involving the applicability of the comparative negligence 
defense in a wrongful death case, was the subject of three 
hearings on November 14, 1986; January 20, 1987; and January 
22, 1987. 
On the first issue, the trial judge ruled that 
pursuant to the wrongful death statute, §§78-11-7, and 
78-11-12, U.C.A., claims can only be made by and for the 
decedent's lawful heirs. (T-738) The judge remarked that a 
broad definition of "heirs11, encompassing family members such 
as brothers and sisters, unreasonably stretches the statutory 
language and is inconsistent with Utah's conservative statutory 
scheme recognizing a cause of action only for those normally 
considered dependents. (T-739) The judge ruled, however, that 
he would not exclude testimony from the brothers and sisters 
concerning their perception of the losses suffered by their 
parents. (T-739) 
As to the admissibility of a stipulation on the blood 
alcohol content of the decedent, the judge admitted the 
stipulation during trial under Rules 803(8) and 803(6),(23), 
(24), Utah Rules of Evidence. (T-816) At the October 31, 1986 
hearing, the judge noted that according to the documents 
submitted, including a letter of April 25, 1987, (Exhibit F, 
Appellant's Brief), former counsel had apparent authority to 
represent the plaintiff at the time the stipulation was 
-4-
executed, and the plaintiff received some benefit from the 
stipulation in terms of not having to attend two depositions 
requested by the defendants to authenticate the blood/alcohol 
report. (T-740, 741). In addition, the judge found that the 
defendants might suffer prejudice, in terms of not being able 
to produce previously available witnesses, should the 
stipulation be disallowed. (T-741) The judge found no 
evidence that the defendants caused plaintiff's counsel to 
enter into the stipulation by fraud, coercion, or 
misrepresentation. (T-741) Finally, the judge ruled that the 
admission of the stipulation did not preclude the plaintiff 
from proffering evidence to challenge the blood/alcohol 
report. (T-739) 
On the third issue, involving the applicability of the 
comparative negligence defense, the trial judge ruled that the 
holding in Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Rail Road Co., 186 P.2d 
293, (Utah 1947), cited with approval in Hull v. Silver, 577 
P.2d 103 (Utah 1978), is controlling and that the negligence of 
the decedent may be considered as a defense under the Compara-
tive Negligence Act. (T-749) The judge was not persuaded by 
the minority loss of consortium cases where the comparative 
negligence defense has been declared inapplicable. (T-803) 
The judge acknowledged that the Comparative Negligence Act 
refers only to reducing damages proportionate to the negligence 
of the "person recovering" but opined that the statute also 
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equates the decedent with his legal representative for purposes 
of recovering damages. (T-749) In any event, the judge 
concluded that even if the comparative negligence statute did 
not apply to the decedent's negligent acts, the common law 
doctrine of contributory negligence would then apply, 
completely barring any recovery if the decedent were negligent 
to any degree. (T-884, 885) 
As to the factual allegations presented in appellant's 
brief, respondents are unable to effectively refute such 
claimed facts because appellant failed to order a transcript of 
the trial below and failed to seek an agreed statement in lieu 
of a transcript. Respondents object to many of appellant's 
facts because they are inaccurate and/or were not part of the 
evidence presented during trial of this case in the lower court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant's failure to order a transcript of the 
proceedings below, coupled with appellant's failure to cite the 
record below, requires this Court to conclude that the lower 
court ruled properly and to affirm the judgment of the lower 
court. 
2. Prior to the adoption of the Comparative 
Negligence Act, this Court held that the contributory 
negligence of the decedent was a defense to a wrongful death 
action. Accordingly, the lower court properly allowed the 
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contributory negligence of the decedent to be compared with the 
negligence of the respondents. 
3. The loss of consortium cases which bar 
consideration of contributory negligence represent a minority 
position, do not preclude consideration of contributory 
negligence in wrongful death actions, are irrelevant to the 
case before this Court because the case under consideration is 
a wrongful death case and not a loss of consortium case and 
Utah does not recognize a loss of consortium cause of action. 
4. The lower court judge properly concluded that the 
heirs of the decedent, an unmarried, male adult, who died 
intestate, were his parents. 
5. The stipulation concerning the blood alcohol of 
decedent was knowingly and duly executed by appellant's 
attorney and the lower court correctly ruled that appellant was 
bound by the stipulation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGED FACTS, EXHIBITS AND 
RULINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY CITATIONS 
TO THE RECORD. 
Rules 24(a)(7)(9) and 24(e) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly require that all statements of fact and 
references to the proceeding below must be supported with 
citations to the record: 
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The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and 
in the order here indicated: 
...(7) A statement of the case. The 
statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a 
statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All 
statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record 
[see paragraph (e)]... 
...(9) An argument. The argument 
shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues 
presented and the reason therefor, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on. 
[Rule 24(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court (emphasis added)] 
* * * 
(e) References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as 
paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to 
pages of the reporter's transcript, or 
to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed 
statement prepared pursuant to Rule 
11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits 
shall include exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in contro-
versy, reference shall be made to the 
pages of the transcript at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and 
received or rejected. [Rule 24(e) 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court] 
In interpreting these rules, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that where a party makes no references to the record 
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to substantiate his contentions, it is appropriate for the 
reviewing court to presume that the findings of the lower court 
were supported by admissible, competent, and substantial 
evidence. See, e.g., Fackrell v. Fackrell, no. 19597 (Utah 
Supreme Court, July 1, 1987); State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1986); State v. Hutchinqs, 672 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Vigil. 661 P.2d 947 (Utah 1983); Baqnall v. Suburbia Land Co.. 
542 P.2d 183 (Utah 1975). 
Despite the above rulings, appellant advanced without 
appropriate citations nine factual allegations on pages 4 and 5 
of his brief and supplemented these purported and 
unsubstantiated facts on pages 26 through 29 of his brief. 
Appellant was given opportunity by Chief Justice Gordon R. Hall 
to supplement his factual allegations with citations to the 
record, but appellant again failed to provide appropriate 
citations. The appellant merely ordered a transcript of the 
lower court's rulings on motions in limine, which does not 
contain evidence in support of all the allegations on pages 4 
and 5 of appellant's brief. For example, the transcript 
ordered does not contain any evidence in support of allegations 
2. 3. 4. 6, 8. and 9 on pages 4 and 5. Appellant continues to 
make allegations which are unsupported by the ordered 
transcript on pages 26-29 of his brief, as indicated in the 
following examples: 
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. . . [Respondents had absolutely no 
evidence that Darin Kelson was 
intoxicated on the night he died. On 
the other hand, appellant was able to 
produce testimony of witnesses who were 
with Darin Kelson for the entire day 
prior to his death, right up to two 
minutes before the time of the 
collision. Their uncontroverted 
testimony was that he had only one 
drink several hours before the 
collision and that he looked and acted 
perfectly sober at all times. 
(Appellant' s Brief, pp. 27, 28, no 
citations provided). 
* * * 
Mr. Hansen later admits that he had no 
authority to enter into the Stipula-
tion, can't fathom why he may have done 
it, and doesn't even remember doing 
it. He actually stated to the 
undersigned "I must have been drunk 
when I did it." (Appellant' s Brief, p. 
26, no citations provided). 
Appellant not only failed to appropriately cite the 
record but presented facts and exhibits in his brief that were 
never introduced in the lower court proceeding (i.e.. Exhibits 
C & G). Since appellant did not bother to order a transcript 
of the trial, even after receiving permission to supplement the 
record following the filing of his brief, this Court should 
presume that the trial judge correctly understood and evaluated 
the facts and ruled accordingly. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF THE APPELLANT'S DECEDENT 
SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH THAT OF 
RESPONDENTS IN A WRONGFUL DEATH CASE. 
A. THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE DECEDENT'S NEGLIGENCE IN A 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION. 
In Helfrich v. Oqden City Ry. Co., 26 P.295 (Utah 
1891) and Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 186 P.2d 
293 (Utah 1947), amended in 189 P.2d 701 (Utah 1948), the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the defense of contributory negligence 
may be applied in a wrongful death action brought by the 
decedent's heirs. Accordingly, if the decedent's negligence, 
even if slight, contributed to his death, the decedent's heirs 
are barred from suing other negligent parties. 
In 1973, the Utah Legislature adopted the Comparative 
Negligence Act, Section 78-27-37, U.C.A., which softened the 
harsh effect of the contributory negligence doctrine. Under 
comparative negligence, if the negligence of the plaintiff is 
less than that of the defendant, the plaintiff is no longer 
barred from seeking recovery. 
Appellant bases his right to sue on the Comparative 
Negligence Act, and argues that the Act not only permits the 
heirs of a negligent decedent to sue but also bars introduction 
of any evidence of the decedent's negligence. Appellant 
contends that the language of the comparative negligence 
statute which reads: "Any damages allowed shall be diminished 
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in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the 
person recovering," precludes consideration of the decedent's 
negligence since the decedent is not the person recovering. 
Appellant's contention is faulty in that appellant 
assumes that evidence of the decedent's negligence is barred 
merely because the comparative negligence statute does not 
expressly provide for consideration of the decedent's 
negligence. A more reasonable interpretation is that the 
legislature, in adopting the comparative negligence statute, 
simply addressed the typical situation where the plaintiff is 
the injured party seeking relief and that the legislature had 
no intention of preventing consideration of a decedent's 
negligence in a wrongful death action. Otherwise, the Court 
must presume, on the basis of a single vague clause which does 
not specifically distinguish between the rights of heirs and 
the rights of injured parties, that the legislature discarded 
the long-standing Utah precedent described in Van Wagoner and 
applied in all subseguent cases. 
In Van Wagoner, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
heirs are only entitled to sue under the wrongful death statute 
if the death is "wrongful." Where the deceased has solely or 
proximately contributed negligently to his own death, his death 
is not actionable because it is not "wrongful," supra at 303. 
...assume that the deceased had only 
been injured in this collision. The 
right of action would run in his favor, 
and the defense of contributory 
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negligence would have been properly 
submitted. The right of action running 
to the [heirs] in this case is founded 
on the same unlawful acts of the 
defendant, but the loss and damages 
suffered by them arise out of the death 
of the deceased. The legislature has 
thus said the right of action vests in 
the heirs-at-law if death ensues, but 
it does not say the rights of the third 
parties are modified, altered, or 
changed. On the contrary, it bases 
recovery on the wrongful death by 
another, and wrongful is used in the 
sense of wrongful as against the 
deceased, and does not include those 
situations where the deceased either 
solely or proximately contributes 
negligently to his death. Supra at 303. 
Van Wagoner's consideration of the decedent's negligence in 
determining whether the death is wrongful applies egually well 
to comparative negligence actions as to contributory negligence 
actions. Thus, Van Wagoner's analysis should not be 
disregarded, as appellant suggests, simply because Van Wagoner 
predates the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act. 
Clearly, Utah courts do not share appellant's 
interpretation of the comparative negligence statute; Utah 
courts today routinely apply the defense of comparative 
negligence in wrongful death actions. For example, in Jensen 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984), 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the "unit rule," allowing 
comparison of the combined negligence of all the defendants 
against the comparative negligence of the decedent. In 
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extending the comparative negligence defense to heirs. the 
Jensen court had no apparent problem with the language of the 
1973 comparative negligence statute. 
Likewise. in other states which have comparative 
negligence provisions similar to the Utah statute, evidence of 
the decedent's negligence is permitted in wrongful death 
actions. For example, in Mayo v. Tri-Bell Industries. Inc., 
787 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1986). a case cited by appellant 
in his brief. page 15. the court admitted evidence of 
decedent's comparative negligence despite language in the Texas 
statute which only permits a reduction of damages "proportion-
ate to the amount of negligence attributed to the person or 
party recovering." (emphasis added). 
Even appellant in his brief alludes to the recognition 
among courts of the potential unfairness and incongruity that 
would result if a slightly negligent tortfeasor may be sued, 
without the defense of comparative negligence, for the death of 
a grossly negligent family member. (Appellant's Brief. pp. 
20-21) Appellant contends, nevertheless, that since the 
comparative negligence doctrine is a legislative enactment, 
such inequalities. if any. should be remedied by the 
legislature and not by the courts. Appellant fails to 
recognize, however, that the wrongful death statute is also a 
legislative product which, as mentioned, requires at the outset 
that the death be "wrongful." 
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Acceptance of appellant's interpretation would 
necessitate the rejection of the prevailing application of the 
wrongful death statute as clarified in Van Wagoner. The law 
disfavors the "repeal by implication" of a former statute so 
long as the new and former statutes can be interpreted 
reasonably together. University of Utah v. Richards, 59 P.96 
(Utah 1899). Accordingly, the wrongful death statute should 
continue to be available to heirs and the defense of 
comparative negligence to defendants. Such an interpretation 
facilitates simultaneous application of both statutes without 
circumventing the intended purpose of either. It also leads to 
the most eguitable result, allowing the trier of fact to 
consider the negligence of all participants in the injury or 
death, rather than only the party being sued. 
B. UTAH'S COMMON LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONTENTION THAT THE DEFENSE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS 
ABOLISHED IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS. 
The only Utah case referenced in appellant's brief in 
support of the argument that the defense of comparative 
negligence is barred in wrongful death actions is Hu 11 v. 
Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah 1978), in which the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a wrongful death action is not subject to the 
doctrine of interspousal immunity. However, a close 
examination of Hull reveals that the case does not expressly or 
impliedly support appellant's argument. Rather, Hull 
-15-
distinguishes between disabilities to sue, such as interspousal 
immunity, which are extinguished by death; and defenses which 
inhere in the tort, such as comparative negligence, which are 
not extinguished by death. Moreover, contrary to appellant's 
assertion, Hull does not stand for the position that the Utah 
Supreme Court has "unequivocally" accepted the non-derivative 
theory for characterizing wrongful death actions. 
Hull, like other Utah cases, recognizes that there are 
elements of a wrongful death action which are non-derivative in 
nature and elements which are derivative. Obviously, heirs' 
suits for damages in a wrongful death action are non-derivative 
in the sense that damages for loss of support and companionship 
of the decedent are independent and separate from the damages 
to which the decedent might be entitled had he survived. 
Admittedly, Hull is not the first case in Utah which discusses 
the general non-derivative elements of a claim for wrongful 
death. See e.g., Mason v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 24 P. 796 (Utah 
1890); Hailing v. Industrial Commission, 263 P.78 (Utah 1927). 
Despite the recognition among Utah courts of the 
non-derivative elements of a wrongful death action, Hull also 
recognizes, referring to cases from Utah and other states, that 
actions for wrongful death are derivative in the sense that 
they "derive from the wrongful act causing the death." 
Upchurch v. Hubbard, 188 P.2d 82 (Wash. 1947); cited in Hull, 
supra at 106. Hull cites with approval language from Van 
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Wagoner, in which the Van Wagoner court refuted the argument 
that wrongful death actions are wholly derivative and thus free 
from the defense of contributory negligence. Hull, supra at 
103-105. Van Wagoner stated the obvious argument that a 
wrongful death action is derivative in the sense that "the 
right of action running to the appellants... is founded on the 
same unlawful acts of the defendant..." and "the loss and 
damages suffered by them arise out of the death of the 
deceased." Hull, supra at 104, 105. 
Consistent with the above analysis of the 
derivative/non-derivative nature of a wrongful death action, 
the Hull court, citing Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723 
(Wash. 1954), delineated between derivative defenses which 
inhere in the tort and non-derivative defenses which are 
personal to the decedent. Hull, supra at 105-106. The Hull 
court accepted the holding in Johnson that defenses which 
inhere in the tort, such as where "decedent proximately 
contributed, through consent, negligence, or unlawful acts, to 
his own injury," (Hu11, supra at 105, citing Johnson) or 
"defenses which are based upon decedent's course of conduct 
after the injury and before death," (Hu 11, supra at 105), are 
not extinguished by the decedent's death. 
Hull, then, is no different than other Utah cases 
which recognize that a wrongful death action is essentially 
non-derivative, but subject to certain defenses which are 
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derivative. E.g., Van Wagoner, supra at 303; Mingus v. 
Olsson, 201 P.2d (Ut. 1949). This same conclusion was reached 
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when it was called upon 
to interpret Utah's wrongful death statute: 
[E]ven though it is a separate and 
distinct action which arises on the 
death of the decedent, the foundation 
of the right of action is the original 
wrongful injury to the decedent. And 
it is essential to the maintenance of 
the action that the wrongful act or 
default be of such character that the 
decedent could have maintained an 
action to recover damages for his 
injury if death had not ensued. While 
it is not a derivative action in the 
ordinary meaning of the term, recovery 
cannot be had unless the decedent could 
have recovered damages for his wrongful 
injury if he had survived. Francis v. 
Southern Pacific, 162 F.2d 813 (10th 
Cir. 1947) 
Since Hull does not support appellant's argument but, 
in fact. specifically refutes it, appellant's assumption 
concerning Utah's unqualified adoption of the non-derivative 
theory for reviewing wrongful death defenses and appellant's 
tortured comparison of the comparative negligence defense to 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, should be rejected. 
C. THE MINORITY HOLDING IN LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CASES 
FROM OTHER STATES IS INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO ABOLISH THE 
APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES. 
Appellant claims that since jurisdictions with 
non-derivative loss of consortium statutes "unanimously" 
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disapprove of the proportionate reduction, due to the 
decedent's negligence, of loss of consortium damages, the 
decedent's negligence should not have been considered in this 
wrongful death action. Appellant's argument is misleading in 
four respects: (1) As discussed in Point II, Utah courts have 
never established that Utah is a "non-derivative" jurisdiction 
which refuses to apply comparative negligence in wrongful death 
cases. (2) Only a minority of jurisdictions refuse to reduce 
loss of consortium damages proportionate to the decedent's 
negligence. (3) Of the states referred to by appellant which 
do not allow a reduction of loss of consortium damages, none of 
these have abolished the comparative negligence defense in 
wrongful death claims. (4) Utah does not have a loss of 
consortium statute and this Court has refused to recognize a 
common law right to sue for loss of consortium. 
Appellant does not cite one case from Utah or any 
other state which directly stands for the proposition that 
comparative negligence is barred as a defense to a wrongful 
death action. Rather, appellant relies on a handful of loss of 
consortium cases in other jurisdictions where courts have 
refused to allow a reduction of a spouse's consortium damages 
due to the other spouse's negligence. As indicated in Runcorn 
v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 690 P.2d 324, 329 (Id. 1984), 
such cases represent the minority holding among states. The 
Idaho Supreme Court surveyed a number of comparative negligence 
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jurisdictions and determined that the majority of jurisdictions 
allow for a reduction of loss of consortium damages. The 
majority ruling is also reflected in the Restatement of Torts, 
2d, Section 494, which applies the defense of comparative 
negligence to both wrongful death actions and loss of 
consortium actions. 
As discussed in Point II above, the Utah courts 
approve of the use of the comparative negligence defense in 
wrongful death actions. As to loss of consortium actions, Utah 
does not have a position since Utah does not have a loss of 
consortium statute and this Court has refused to recognize a 
common law right to recover for loss of consortium. Hackford 
v. Utah Power & Light, 59 U.A.R. 21 (Utah Supreme Court, June 
9, 1987). However, even if this court were persuaded by the 
philosophy of the minority in the loss of consortium cases, it 
does not follow that those minority decisions dictate that the 
defense of decedent's negligence should be barred in wrongful 
death actions. Most jurisdictions which refuse to allow 
evidence of comparative negligence in loss of consortium cases 
nevertheless continue to allow consideration of comparative 
negligence in wrongful death actions. Thus, the cases cited by 
appellant, discussed below, do not support the conclusion 
proffered. 
Feltch v. General Rental Company, 421 N.E. 2d 67 
(Mass. 1981), and Morgan v. Lalumiere, 493 N.E. 2d 206 (Mass. 
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1986), demonstrate appellant's failure to distinguish between 
wrongful death actions and loss of consortium claims. Both 
cases involved loss of consortium claims arising out of the 
injuries to a surviving spouse. Since the spouses survived, 
neither case considered the Massachusetts' wrongful death 
statute. If the cases had involved wrongful deaths, the 
comparative negligence of the decedents would surely have been 
considered because Massachusetts' wrongful death statute 
provides that: 
A person who by his negligence causes 
the death of a person, or by willful, 
wanton or reckless act causes the death 
of a person under such circumstances 
that the deceased could have recovered 
damages for personal injuries if his 
death had not resulted, ... shall be 
liable in damages.... [229(2) Annot. 
Laws of Mass. (1986)(emphasis added)] 
Thus, in Massachusetts, an action for wrongful death 
may only be maintained by the decedent's heirs or personal 
representative if the decedent could have recovered in his own 
name had he not died. In one recent Massachusetts case 
interpreting the above statute, it was held to be error not to 
consider decedent's negligence. Lane v. Meserve, 482 N.E. 2d 
530 (Mass. 1985). In light of the above statute and its 
interpretation, appellant's statement, in connection with 
Feltch, that "there is no basis in logic or law" for 
distinguishing between loss of consortium and wrongful death 
cases is inaccurate. Obviously, the legislature in one of the 
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so called purist "non-derivative" jurisdictions saw logic in 
admitting evidence of the decedent's negligence in a wrongful 
death case and thus provided so in the law. 
Likewise, in Christie v. Maxwell, 696 P.2d 1256 (Wash. 
1985), (Appellant's Brief, p. 14), the Washington court, 
although declining to allow the defense of contributory 
negligence against the claim for loss of consortium, noted that 
the defense is available pursuant to statute in a wrongful 
death case. The recognition of a statutory basis under the 
wrongful death statute for considering the decedent's 
negligence is essentially the same conclusion reached by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Van Wagoner. 
Brann v. Exeter Clinic, 498 A.2d 334 (N.H. 1985), 
(Appellant' s Brief, p. 15), involved a wrongful death claim by 
a widow, as well as a loss of consortium claim against a 
medical provider for his failure to diagnose the deceased 
husband's malignant mole. The court found that there was 
insufficient evidence of a causal connection to support the 
comparative negligence instruction given by the trial court 
relative to the wrongful death claim, not that the negligence 
of the deceased was inadmissible as a defense in all wrongful 
death cases. The court's ruling concerning the loss of 
consortium claim thus should not be interpreted as precluding 
the defense of contributory negligence in appropriate wrongful 
death claims. 
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Like the Massachusetts' cases, Herold v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241 (8th cir. 1985)(Appellant's 
Brief, p. 16), involved a loss of consortium claim resulting 
from injuries to a surviving spouse. The federal court did not 
have opportunity to consider North Dakota's wrongful death 
statute and furthermore expressly recognized in its opinion 
that there was no North Dakota case law on point as to whether 
a loss of consortium award could be reduced by the other 
spouse's negligence. Although the federal court decided that 
loss of consortium claim should not be reduced, the case, 
absent state court interpretation, does not represent the law 
in North Dakota with respect to either loss of consortium or 
wrongful death claims. 
The holding in the case. Fuller v.Buhrow, 292 N.W. 2d 
672 (Iowa. 1980) (Appellant's Brief p. 18), is expressly 
limited to loss of consortium claims and is not fully 
applicable to Utah because part of the rationale of the Fuller 
decision was the perceived unfairness of the contributory 
negligence doctrine. The court was concerned that under 
contributory negligence, a negligent tortfeasor may escape from 
all liability, thus forcing the plaintiff to assume the full 
burden of damages. Id. at 676. This problem is not present in 
a comparative negligence jurisdiction such as Utah, where the 
negligence of all participants in an accident is taken into 
account. 
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Appellant has not produced one case which has ruled 
that comparative negligence is barred in a wrongful death 
action but has relied on loss of consortium cases for his 
contention that decedent's negligence was improperly introduced 
and considered at trial. Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
the lowerf court's decision on the issue of comparative 
negligence. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
DECEDENT'S SIBLINGS COULD NOT RECOVER 
DAMAGES UNDER UTAH'S WRONGFUL DEATH 
STATUTE. 
The Utah wrongful death statute provides that the only 
persons entitled to sue for the wrongful death of a non-minor 
are the decedent's heirs or his personal representative: 
Except as provided in chapter 1, of 
Title 35, when the death of a person 
not a minor is caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another, his heirs, 
or his personal representatives for the 
benefit of his heirs, may maintain an 
action for damages against the person 
causing the death, or, if such person 
is employed by another person who is 
responsible for his conduct, then also 
against such other person. If such 
adult person has a guardian at the time 
of his death, only one action can be 
maintained for the injury to or death 
of such person, and such action may be 
brought by either the personal 
representatives of such adult deceased 
person, or the benefit of his heirs, or 
by such guardian for the benefit of the 
heirs as provided in the next preceding 
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section [78-11-6]. In every action 
under this and the next preceding 
section [78-11-6] such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of 
the case may be just. [78-11-7, U.C.A. 
(1953)] 
Since the term "heirs" is not defined in the wrongful 
death statute, one must look to Utah's probate code for a 
definition: 
"Heirs" means those persons, 
including the surviving spouse, who are 
entitled under the statutes of 
intestate succession to the property of 
a decedent. [75-1-201(17), U.C.A. 
(1953)] 
The part of the intestate not 
passing to the surviving spouse under 
section 75-2-102, or the entire 
intestate estate if there is no 
surviving spouse, passes as follows: 
(a) to the issue of the decedent by 
representation. (b) If there is no 
surviving issue, to his parent or 
parents egually, (c) If there is no 
surviving issue or parent, to the issue 
of the parents or either of them by 
representation... [75-2-103(a)(b)(c). 
U.C.A. (1953) (emphasis added)] 
Accordingly, the siblings of the decedent in the 
instant case do not qualify as heirs because the decedent has 
surviving parents. 
Application of the intestacy statute in determining 
which relatives qualify as "heirs" under the wrongful death 
statute is common practice among states. For example, in the 
case. In the Matter of Norwest Capitol Management and Trust 
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Company, 697 P.2d 930 (Mont. 1985), amended 704 P.2d 1082 
(Mont. 1985), the court held that the definition of "heirs" in 
Montana's wrongful death statute meant those who take upon 
decedent's death under the intestacy statute, and that the 
sister of the decedent does not qualify as an heir. Although 
this issue has not been specifically considered in Utah on 
appeal, the Van Wagoner court ruled that the right of action 
for wrongful death vests in "heirs-at-law" (supra at 303) 
As acknowledged by appellant, there must be a limit to 
the class of persons who may sue for wrongful death. 
Otherwise, any person who suffers as a result of the decedent's 
death may join as a party in the wrongful death action. 
Appellant's suggestion that siblings be included in the 
definition of lawful heirs is unreasonable since the degree of 
emotional injuries suffered by siblings or other relatives 
varies in each case. In another setting, grandparents could be 
equally damaged by the death. Thus, the statutory definition 
of heirs serves as a logical basis for determining the class of 
plaintiffs entitled to see. 
In any event, even if the trial judge erred in not 
allowing siblings to sue, the exclusion would at most be 
"harmless error" since no damages were awarded to the 
plaintiffs. Moreover, the siblings' "psychic" injuries would 
have no impact on the jury's findings on the issue of the 
deceased's negligence. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING A STIPULATION 
CONCERNING THE BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT OF 
THE DECEDENT. 
The applicable rule of law, as alluded to in 
appellant's brief, page 26, is that stipulations entered into 
by parties are generally binding and should not be lightly set 
aside. First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundell and 
Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). Stipulations are like 
any other type of private agreement and may not be repudiated 
absent a justification in law or eguity. Klein v. Klein, 544 
P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). It is within the sole discretion of the 
trial judge to determine whether law or eguity demands relief 
from a stipulation. Id. at 476. 
In this case, counsel produced no positive evidence 
that the former counsel who signed the stipulation did not 
understand or agree to the stipulation (see e.g. , Dove v. Cude, 
710 P.2d 170)(Utah 1985), or that counsel lacked authority at 
the time of the stipulation to sign on behalf of the plaintiffs 
(see, e.g., Financial Indem. Co. v. Bevans, 590 P.2d 276 
(Oregon App. 1979). The fact that present counsel disagrees 
with former counsel's tactical decision to enter into a 
stipulation does not constitute grounds for repudiating a valid 
stipulation. Freeman v. Gee, 423 P.2d 155 (Utah 1967). It is 
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sufficient that the trial court simply did not find justifiable 
legal or equitable cause for repudiating the stipulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondents respectfully 
submit that this Court should affirm the judgment of the lower 
court. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: 
(JP/209+) 
ittlCIA \^>IARLOWE 
Deputy Comity At torney 
THOMAS L. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents . 
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